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During fiscal year 1999, the Navy conducted the Pearl Harbor Fleet Maintenance 
Pilot program, converting the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard from a revolving fund activity 
to merge with the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility and consolidate under 
appropriated funding.  This research will relate the complexities of change during the 
Pearl Harbor Pilot, specifically with regard to the two distinct types of funding methods 
used at the Depot and Intermediate Maintenance Facilities:  revolving funds (Navy 
Working Capital Fund) and appropriated funds (mission funds), respectively.  The 
primary research goal is to define the advantages and disadvantages of accounting for the 
consolidated operations at the Pearl Harbor Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility with appropriated funding.  To provide an analysis of this topic, results of the 
Pearl Harbor Pilot performance metrics will be studied and the two types of funding will 
be compared and contrasted.  Results of the Pilot program are mixed and are still open to 
debate two years after the conclusion of the test.  Implications for the Marine Corps 
Maintenance Depots are paralleled to the current dilemma facing the Navy on whether to 
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1.  Naval Ship Maintenance and the Background for Change 
In 1992, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso, defined the 
term “regional maintenance” to describe a new concept of streamlining maintenance 
activities to become more cost effective and to reduce the infrastructure of the Navy’s 
maintenance facilities.  The past dozen years have brought about force reductions in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and with that, continuous searches for improvements in 
quality and efficiency.  The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act of 1990, and the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, have set the tone for all 
federal government services to follow in their quest for the most efficient practices.   
Further defining his maintenance goals in 1994, the CNO established a three 
phased Regional Maintenance Program (RMP) with the following concepts:  [Ref. 1] 
· Consolidate intermediate- level maintenance activities to create efficient 
practices.  
· Integrate intermediate and depot- level maintenance activities with 
management by the Fleet commanders. 
· Conduct fleet maintenance using a single maintenance process.  
Embracing these concepts, and specifically the second concept above, the Navy 
launched a pilot project on April 30, 1998, consolidating management, operations, and 
funding of the Naval Shipyard (NSY) and the Intermediate Maintenance Facility (IMF) at 
Pearl Harbor (Pearl Harbor Pilot).  Pearl Harbor was the logical location for this pilot 
project because of the close proximity between the NSY and the IMF.  The two facilities 
were just minutes from each other and in some cases, lay within sight of each other 
across the harbor.  However, consolidating these two facilities was a major undertaking.  
There were fundamental differences in the types of work, employees, and financing 
between the NSY and the IMF that had to be addressed when considering such a change.  
The barriers to be overcome were those same fundamentals that drove the operations of 
depot-level maintenance at the NSY and intermediate- level maintenance at the IMF.        
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2.  Naval Maintenance Hierarchy 
The Naval service classifies maintenance actions according to three categories: 
[Ref. 2] 
· Organizational - basic maintenance activities that are accomplished at the 
individual unit level.  Both preventive and corrective maintenance are 
considered as organizational- level maintenance.  Examples of organizational-
level maintenance would be seen as a ship’s crew making repairs while 
underway.  
 
· Intermediate - significant repair work beyond the capability of individual 
units.  The majority of workers at intermediate- level maintenance facilities are 
active duty Sailors and Marines.  Examples of intermediate-level maintenance 
are engine overhauls, metal work, or more technically demanding tasks. 
 
· Depot - major repair and replacement work consisting of the most technically 
demanding tasks.  The majority of workers at depot- level maintenance 
facilities are highly trained and certified civilian employees.  Examples of 
depot-level maintenance are engine replacement, major system upgrades, or 
life cycle overhauls.  All U.S. naval shipyards are depot- level maintenance 
facilities.   
 
3.  Funding Differences 
This research will relate the complexities of change during the Pearl Harbor Pilot, 
specifically with regard to the two distinct types of funding methods used at the depot 
and intermediate maintenance facilities:  revolving funds (Navy Working Capital Fund) 
and appropriated (mission) funds, respectively.   
· Revolving Funds  - funds of which all income is accrued through its 
operations and are available to finance the activity’s continuing operations 
without fiscal year limits.  A revolving fund activity accepts an order from a 
customer, finances the  costs of operation using its “working capital,” and bills 
the customer, who then reimburses the fund for the service or performance of 
work.  [Ref. 3]  Traditionally, depot-level maintenance is operated as a 
revolving or “Working Capital” fund.   
 
· Appropriated Funds  - funds that are authorized by Congress and made 
available for obligation towards a specified purpose.  Most intermediate and 
organizational- level maintenance are budgeted in the Operation and 
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Maintenance (O&M) appropriations.  These “mission” specific funds expire 
annually.  Traditionally, intermediate and organizational- level maintenance 
activities are operated by the obligation of appropriated or “mission” funds. 
 
B.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to document the significant accomplishments, 
challenges, benefits, and drawbacks of the financial system conversion of the Pearl 
Harbor Fleet Maintenance Pilot Program.  This study will discuss the significant issues 
and lessons learned to consider when future programs undertake similar financial 
management system conversions.   
This research will analyze the events throughout the merger of the Pearl Harbor 
depot and intermediate maintenance facilities and the conversion of financing from 
revolving to appropriated funding.  The objective is to identify key success factors as 
well as the disadvantages and unresolved issues of this financial system conversion.   
The primary research goal is to define the advantages and disadvantages of 
accounting for the operations of the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF) with appropriated funding, as compared to 
maintaining two separate facilities with both revolving and appropriated funds. 
 
C.  SCOPE 
The purpose of this research is to document the financial management conversion 
of the PHNSY & IMF from revolving funds to appropriated funds.  The benefit of this 
analysis will be realized with parallels that can be drawn towards similar financial 
management conversions.  The focus is upon the implementation and financ ial aspects of 
the merger of the PHNSY & IMF.  Included will be before and after financial and non-
financial performance measures to determine if value was added as a result of this 
merger.  Conclusions will include a discussion of whether a similar transfer of financial 
systems is worthy of consideration for Marine Corps depot maintenance facilities. 
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D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
· Conducting a literature search of government reports, magazine articles, and 
other library information resources. 
· Conducting interviews with key financial and information technology 
personnel of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) staff and 
the PHNSY & IMF. 
· Conducting a review of DoD, DoN, and USMC orders and directives 
regarding the operations of the Navy Working Capital Fund and appropriated 
fund maintenance activities. 
· Collecting and comparing data from CINCPACFLT, PHNSY & IMF, 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and Marine Corps Material Command 
(MARCORMATCOM).  
· Comparing data/information among sources to identify advantages and          
disadvantages of the funding transition during the Pearl Harbor Pilot. 
· Presenting lessons learned for consideration by Marine Corps depot 
maintenance facilities. 
 
E.  ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
· Chapter I is the Introduction. 
· Chapter II defines revolving funds and highlights their principles in regard to 
this thesis.  
· Chapter III defines appropriated funds and illustrates their use in regard to this 
thesis. 
· Chapter IV discusses the consolidation of the PHNSY & IMF. 
· Chapter V discusses findings and recommendations for further research. 
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II.  REVOLVING FUNDS AND THE PEARL HARBOR NAVAL 
SHIPYARD 
 
A.  HISTORY OF REVOLVING FUNDS 
  Revolving funds are those funds of which all income is accrued through its 
operations and are available to finance the activity’s continuing operations without fiscal 
year limits.  Activities that use revolving funds are based upon the principles of 
identifying full costs, recovering all costs, and balancing their workload to precisely 
match those costs.  These activities accept orders and provide goods or services to 
customers financed by appropriated funds and perform the work using their “working 
capital,” or operating cash corpus.  This corpus, or body of cash, is a one-time 
appropriation, or lump-sum transfer of money to begin the operations of a revolving fund 
activity. [Ref. 3]  In turn, the customers are billed at stabilized rates (predetermined 
charges per measurable job) to provide reimbursement to the revolving fund, more 
commonly referred to as the Working Capital Fund (WCF).  This revolving cycle is the 
basis that allows continuous operations without regard to fiscal year (FY) constraints (the 
U.S. Government FY begins each October first).   
Revolving funds have existed in the Navy since the 1870s.  Known as the General 
Account of Advances, this early revolving fund was used to finance the procurement of 
supply inventories. [Ref. 4]  The National Security Act Amendment of 1949 formally 
authorized the establishment of revolving funds within the DoD. [Ref. 3]  Previous to the 
present day system of working capital funds, there existed different forms of revolving 
funds to support various activities and services as necessary.  Each component of the 
Defense Department maintained separate funds for goods and services, existing under 
Stock Funds and Industrial Funds, respectively.  Stock Funds were used to finance 
various classifications of supply; such as repair parts, fuel, clothing, food, and medical 
items.  Industrial Funds were used to finance various services that the military depended 
upon for its existence; such as vehicle and weapon repairs, research and development, 
and ground and aviation depot maintenance. 
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The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) was created in FY 1992 with the 
purpose of transforming the DoD revolving fund activities into more business- like 
management practices.  The DBOF consolidated all Stock and Industrial Funds into one 
centrally managed DoD fund.  The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) 
was responsible for the overall performance and management of the DBOF.  However, 
after just a few years of operations, the DBOF was decidedly too large and cumbersome 
(nearly $70 billion in FY 1997) for central DoD management. [Ref. 4] 
Abolishing the DBOF in FY 1997, the USD(C) established four major working 
capital funds:  the Defense-wide WCF, the Air Force WCF, the Army WCF, and the 
Navy WCF (NWCF).  Each service was given responsibility for the efficient 
management of its own revolving fund.  Total cost visibility was maintained and the 
individual working capital funds were relatively easier to manage because of their 
service-specific scope.  However, even these improvements did not necessarily lead to 
improved financial performance of the working capital fund activities.  There are inherent 
difficulties in the entire concept of working capital funds that make the principle of 
“breaking-even” very hard to attain.  These difficulties lie in accurate predictions of how 
much work is to be performed during a single fiscal year and from that, what is the 
stabilized rate to be charged per unit of work.  Stabilized rates will be described further in 
the next section of this chapter. 
 
B.  CONCEPTS 
1.  Establishing a Working Capital Fund 
There are four criteria an activity must satisfy in order to determine whether it 
may be included as part of the Defense Working Capital Fund: [Ref. 4] 
· The activity must have an identifiable output of products or services. 
· The activity must possess a cost accounting system that collects and identifies 
the full costs of operations. 
· The activity must have a defined customer or set of customers. 
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· The activity must be able to evaluate itself versus the customer (buyer versus 
seller) and identify how a buyer has the power to impact cost by changing the 
demand for goods or services. 
 
The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard met all of these requirements and had 
historically operated as a revolving account for nearly 50 years under Industrial Funds, 
the DBOF, and finally the NWCF.  It supported U.S. naval vessels stationed in and 
passing through the Hawaiian Islands and conducted a small percentage of reimbursable 
work for ship alterations and inactivations, as well as from ground units from different 
services and agencies in Hawaii. [Ref. 1] 
 
2.  Budgeting for a Working Capital Fund 
Working capital funds are initially funded by a small body of cash, or corpus, to 
enable them to begin operations.  Throughout the fiscal years, work is performed and  is 
funded largely from the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation on a 
reimbursement basis from the activity’s customers.  Once these funds are transferred into 
a working capital funding system, there is no fiscal year deadline placed upon the 
obligation (a legal contract to make a future payment of money) of these funds.  The 
customers who conduct business with working capital fund activities plan, program, and 
budget reimbursable funds into their annual budget request to be spent at those activities.  
These no-year funds are matched at the working capital fund activities during their 
budget formulation process and are the resources that drive their daily operations once 
they are authorized and appropriated by Congress. 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the process for 
creating and managing DoD financial resources.  The purpose of this system is to 
produce a set of plans and programs and finally a budget to support the entire Department 
of Defense. [Ref. 4]  The Program Budget Decision (PBD) is prepared during the budget 
phase of this highly complex annual system.  This document is issued during a joint 
review of the individual services’ budget submission.  This review is conducted by 
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members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), and they recommend changes to particular programs for the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense to issue within each PBD. 
All of the various working capital fund activities that are affected within a budget 
year receive a draft copy of the PBD to reflect the proposed decision made during the 
review.  They are addressed to the individual activity group that manages the specific 
function within the particular working capital fund activity. [Ref. 4]  For example, at 
Pearl Harbor, the activity group manager is the Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command (COMNAVSEA).  Naval Sea Systems Command is responsible for the depot 
maintenance operations for all shipyards throughout the Navy.  As such, it is the activity 
that responds to any adjustment or request for information issued within a draft Program 
Budget Decision addressed towards Navy Ship Depot Maintenance. 
Once all responses to the draft PBD are made, the final PBD for working capital 
fund activities documents changes to the previous fiscal year rates, approves stabilized 
billing rates for the new fiscal year, and approves funding levels for Congress to 
appropriate towards working capital fund customer accounts. [Ref. 4]  The Congressional 
appropriation process will be described further in Chapter III. 
 
3.  Rate Formulation and Stabilized Rates 
The relationship between the former Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (and any WCF 
activity) and its customers was an important one:  from the customers came workload 
estimates which then drove the Shipyard planners to budget for a stabilized workload, 
workforce, and rates to be charged for specific work.  However, the customers could not 
accurately estimate how much work they could afford until they knew the stabilized rate.  
This “Catch-22” situation usually resulted in both the stabilized rate and the customers’ 
workload estimates being inaccurate, and led the shipyard to not recover all the costs of 
operation. 
A Navy Working Capital Fund depot activity such as the former PHNSY typically 
has the goal of performing its work throughout the year towards recovering all costs, or 
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“breaking even.”  The mechanism to achieve this goal is through an accurate budget 
process and establishing annual stabilized rates.     
Customers are requested to project workload estimates to the working capital fund 
activity approximately two years prior to a new fiscal year.  For ship maintenance, these 
projections are derived from scheduled ship maintenance availabilities and the best 
judgments from Commanding Officers and Maintenance Departments regarding typical 
or historical depot level maintenance that is likely to occur throughout the future fiscal 
years.  These workload estimates drive the development of the working capital fund 
activities’ stabilized rates, but because they are projected two years in advance, both the 
workload estimates and the rates often contain variances from the actual work performed 
and rates charged. 
The Direct Labor Hours (DLH) are calculated after the workload estimates are 
received.  This is based upon the total time needed to accomplish the estimated workload.  
Since working capital fund activities must recover all costs, the direct labor rate 
computation includes workers’ base pay plus health insurance, retirement, and other 
fringe benefits.   
Then, the total costs are calculated.  This step includes all direct, indirect, and 
general and administrative costs.  These costs are defined further: [Ref. 5]   
· Direct costs consist of charges for labor, material, and contractual services 
directly attributable to the work performed.   
· Indirect costs, also known as overhead, are those charges associated with 
more than one, but not all jobs performed.  Examples could be supervisor 
salaries or office support costs for a specific work (or cost) center.   
· General and Administrative (G&A) costs are those charges distributed to 
all job orders, such as executive management salaries or security system 
costs. 
 
Together, these costs comprise the Cost of Goods Sold (CoGS) estimate.  
Dividing the CoGS estimate by the DLH estimate yields the initial rate for work at a 
working capital fund activity.  Finally, the initial rate is adjusted accordingly for the past 
years’ gains or losses.   
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The overarching principle in any working capital fund activity is to recover the 
full costs of operation.  This is realized by achieving an Accumulated Operating Result 
(AOR) equal to zero; i.e. where revenues equal the operating expenses over the lifetime 
of the activity (the AOR is a cumulative measure that reports the performance of a 
working capital fund activity or activity group spanning the entire operation).  This 
concept is difficult to achieve in reality and costs often exceed revenues because of 
unanticipated expenses.  Most individual working capital fund activities will accept 
negative annual Net Operating Results (NOR) in order to maintain their stabilized rate, 
and thus not affect their customer’s purchasing power.  However, it is the parent working 
capital fund activity group that strives to achieve an AOR equal to zero.  By carefully 
managing its subordinate activities, it may authorize some activities to operate towards a 
loss, while other activities are directed to operate at a level such to recoup those losses. 
Sometimes, due to fortunate circumstances (material price decreases or less labor 
is required than budgeted for a certain task), the NOR may be positive.  In this case, rates 
are reduced the following budget cycle and savings are passed on to the customer.  
Conversely, if the NOR is negative, rates are increased the following budget cycle and 
the losses are passed on to the customer.  These gains or losses are reflected as a 
percentage decrease or increase, respectively, in work unit rates from the previous year.     
The following is an example of the previous concepts:  Listed below are fiscal 
years zero, one, two, and three for an individual working capital fund activity.  To the 
left, the Net Operating Results and the Accumulated Operating Results are noted.  The 
NOR is the yearly ending financial outcome of the activity.  The AOR is simply the sum 
of the year-to-year results of the NOR.  Beginning in Year 0, there is not yet a NOR, and 
the AOR is equal to $0.  The NOR for Year 1 yielded a loss of $500.  Therefore, the 
AOR for Year 1 is likewise a loss of $500.  At the completion of Year 2, the NOR is 
positive $700.  When added to the AOR from the previous year, the AOR for Year 2 
results in $200.  Finally in Year 3, the activity finishes the year with a negative NOR of 
$1000.  To find the Year 3 AOR, the previous years’ AOR, $200, is added to the current 
year’s NOR, thus yielding a final AOR of a $800 loss. 
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Year 0  Year 1   Year 2   Year 3 
NOR =                 -  ($500)   $700   ($1000) 
AOR =    $0  ($500)   $200    ($800) 
 The simple example above illustrates the NOR and AOR for a single working 
capital fund activity.  In practice however, this concept is expanded across an entire 
working capital fund activity group.  As the WCF activity group manager conducts the 
end-of-year assessment of the groups’ AOR, individual activity’s gains or losses are 
distributed to optimally achieve an AOR equal to zero across the entire activity group.   
 
C.  DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard operated as any depot maintenance facility 
under the Navy Working Capital Fund.  According to the FY 1997 PHNSY Analysis of 
Capital Fund, the facility generated negative net operating results from year to year since 
the inception of the Defense Business Operations Fund in FY 1992 and throughout its 
time in the NWCF.  These year-to-year results, or accumulated operating results at Pearl 
Harbor totaled greater than $43 million in losses at the end of FY 1997. [Ref. 2]  Further, 
WCF activities had failed to accomplish the goal of operating on a break-even basis, 
leaving a defense-wide negative AOR of $1.7 billion at the conclusion of FY 1997. [Ref. 
6]  
An additional problem of the PHNSY (as well as with most depot maintenance 
facilities throughout the DoD) was that of excess capacity.  The infrastructure of the 
PHNSY, to include both facilities and personnel, was simply too great to provide cost 
effective service to its customers.  Reductions in customers’ workload estimates further 
compounded this problem, providing less work for the shipyard’s annually budgeted 
workforce; thus increasing its effective cost per unit output.   
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report estimated 40 percent excess capacity 
throughout the DoD’s depot maintenance system.  The same report also forecasted 
PHNSY to have 30 percent daily excess capacity during FY 1999 (before the inception of 
the Pearl Harbor Pilot). [Ref. 6]  Excess capacity occurs when the existing infrastructure  
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(facilities and manpower) of a supporting activity is underemployed and may be a direct 
result of poor workload estimates, as described previously.  In a WCF activity, the 
overhead costs of infrastructure still need to be recouped, regardless of the activity’s 
gainful employment.  Thus, excess capacity plays a significant contribution towards the 
overall inefficiencies of defense depot maintenance and the ineffective management of 
WCF activities.   
The defense downsizing of the 1990s presented both a significant opportunity and 
necessity to find more efficient and effective uses of funds.  The Chief Financial Officer 
Act of 1990 and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 have directed the 
services to find those practices, implement them, and document the results.  The Navy 
responded with the Regional Maintenance Program in 1994 and established seven 
objectives: [Ref. 7] 
· Emphasize process improvement to maintain customer responsiveness and 
Fleet readiness 
· Eliminate excess maintenance infrastructure 
· Better integrate supply support and maintenance requirements 
· Provide maintenance cost visibility 
· Provide compatib le automated data processing (ADP) management across all 
levels of maintenance 
· Maintain positive technical control  
· Reflect DoD and Navy Core Competencies Policy 
 
The Navy realized that to achieve these objectives, a major shift in the 
organizational- intermediate-depot maintenance hierarchy would need to be effected.  
With that, the Pearl Harbor Pilot emerged to serve as a model for the integration of 
intermediate and depot maintenance operations, personnel, and facilities under a unified 
command: the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.  This 
pilot project would attempt to fully exploit the advantages of a combined workforce, 
customer base, and funding source while overcoming the historical financial 
inefficiencies associated with the shipyard’s involvement in the NWCF. 
13 
 













1801 1747 1737 1680
1435 1416
922









































































III.  APPROPRIATED FUNDS AND THE PEARL HARBOR NAVAL  
INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY 
 
A.  OVERVIEW 
Appropriated funds are authorized by Congress and made available for obligation 
towards a specified purpose, for a certain dollar amount, at a specified time.  
Traditionally, intermediate- level and organizational- level maintenance activities are 
operated by the obligation of appropriated funds versus depot-level maintenance and its 
typical use of working capital funds.  Appropriated funding in regard to Naval 
maintenance is also known as “mission” funding, i.e., funds are provided to cover the 
operating costs of the maintenance activity versus customers (the operating Fleet) directly 
paying for those costs.  There are many appropriations that make up the Navy’s budget, 
but it is the Operation and Maintenance appropriation that comprises the bulk of mission 
funds.  These funds are expressly appropriated for certain operating costs, such as civilian 
salaries, the purchase of supplies, the funding of travel orders, or Naval ship 
maintenance.  Operation and Maintenance funds expire annually for obligation purposes.  
To understand the goals behind the execution of “mission” funds, an understanding of the 
budgeting and appropriation process is necessary. 
 
B.  BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATION OVERVIEW 
The budgeting and appropriation process occurs each year with the formulation of 
the Federal budget.  The President, the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), and the various Federal departments and agencies all play major roles in the 
budget process.  Under the DoD, the Navy begins its annual budget process each spring 
for the fiscal year following the next.  For example, in spring of calendar year 2001, the 
Navy would begin the budget process for FY 2003.   
The budget seeks to provide visibility, justification, priorities, and dollar amounts 
for all programs throughout the Navy for the particular fiscal year and projections for the 
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following five years.  The Navy budget is forwarded to the DoD for review and 
subsequent inclusion in the entire Defense budget.  The DoD (and all other Federal 
departments and agencies) submits its budget request, future years’ projections, and 
supporting material to the President during December or January.  The OMB assists the 
President by validating each item in the various budget requests.  Once comple te, the law 
requires the President to submit the Federal budget to Congress by the first Monday in 
February for the coming fiscal year.   
Congress begins its portion of the budget process by using the President’s budget 
and passing the budget resolution, which sets the framework and overall budget totals for 
the next fiscal year.  Congress then begins the process of holding hearings to validate 
programs, authorize their existence, and finally appropriate funds to enable them to 
operate.  Congress passes authorization and appropriation bills for these programs to the 
President to be signed into law.  These laws are the means which give the DoD and all 
Federal programs the authority to incur obligations and make expenditures (the payment 
of those obligations) for specified purposes.  The appropriated funds are then passed to 
the DoD through OMB as an apportionment.  An apportionment sets the level of funds 
that may be used for obligations and expenditures during a specified time period 
(annually, quarterly, etc.).  Apportionments are used by OMB to limit the departments 
and agencies from spending their funds too quickly, and thus requiring supplemental or 
deficiency appropriations. 
The DoN receives its appropriations through the management of the DoD.  From 
the Secretary of the Navy, these funds flow through a network of management down to 
the operational level where they will actually be used.  For example, prior to the Pearl 
Harbor Pilot, the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation used for 
intermediate maintenance at the Pearl Harbor IMF was managed by the facility’s Finance 
Officer.  His fiduciary chain of command followed with supervision by the 
CINCPACFLT Comptroller, the OMN Responsible Office (the Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV) budget office, N82), the Navy Comptroller (the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Financial Management (ASN (FM)), and ultimately, the Secretary of the Navy.  
Each office in this chain sought to ensure the proper and efficient use of funds towards 
intermediate ship maintenance at Pearl Harbor.      
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C.  CATEGORIES OF APPROPRIATIONS 
Appropriations granted by Congress towards Federal programs fall under 
different categories, depending on their nature of business, and are classified according to 
their purpose, duration, and amount.  With regard to duration, appropriations are 
categorized as either annual, multiple year, or no-year.   
The United States Federal fiscal year extends from October 1st until September 
30th.  Annual appropriations must be obligated during the fiscal year specified in the 
appropriation act.  The OMN appropriation is an annual appropriation and is used for 
most organizational- level and intermediate- level ship maintenance.  One of its purposes 
is for funding the maintenance costs of ships and other types of DoD equipment and 
weapon systems.   
Multiple year appropriations are available for use over a specified time period 
greater than one year.  For example, the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) 
appropriation used for the construction and renovation of ships uses a multiple year 
appropriation.  Its obligation availability period is five years in length. 
No-year appropriations are those that support working capital funds.  Working 
capital funds, or revolving funds, work on a reimbursable principle and are not 
constrained by fiscal year limits.  The OMN appropriation used for most depot- level ship 
maintenance is an example of the use of the Navy Working Capital Fund and a no-year 
appropriation.   
 
D.  BUDGET EXECUTION  
Annual appropriations are apportioned on a quarterly basis throughout the fiscal 
year to prevent obligation or expenditures in excess of the appropriation.  For Defense 
spending, this tight control flows from the OMB to the DoD (USD(C)).  The USD(C) 
then allocates funds to each service, which then further allocates the funds down to the 
Responsible Office (SECNAV’s N82), Administering Offices, and the Major Claimants.  
Allocation is the control by which the services delegate the use of funds to ensure 
Congressional intent is met. 
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Major Claimants, such as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet also receive their 
OMN funds on a quarterly basis to help prevent over-obligation of their budget.  It then 
issues planning limitations (a certain dollar allowance, or Operating Target (OPTAR)) to 
its subordinate commands on a quarterly basis and ensures that the commands execute 
their budget according to their previous budget request.  Once an activity obligates 100 
percent of its funds, its operations must cease for the remainder of the fiscal year, unless 
it can find additional or redistributed funding from higher in its chain of command or 
receives a supplemental or deficiency appropriation from Congress.  A supplemental 
appropriation grants additional budget authority to existing appropriations for activities or 
programs that are deemed too critical to run short of funds.  A deficiency appropriation is 
granted after a fiscal year has completed and additional funds are made available to a 
“deficient” appropriation to give it a positive balance.    
Another consideration that annually appropriated or mission funded activities 
must face is the fact that Congress and the President often do not complete the 
appropriation process before the turn of the new fiscal year.  When this occurs, Congress 
typically passes a Continuing Resolution to extend budget authority to specified 
activities.  These funds are made available not as a dollar amount, but rather as a rate at 
which the activities may incur obligations in the new fiscal year until the appropriation 
bills are signed into law.  Without a Continuing Resolution, appropriated funded 
activities must cease operations. 
Additionally, towards the end of the year, should additional funding appear to be 
required to perform mission-critical functions, mission funded activities have to petition 
their chain of command for more money.  If no funds are available for redistribution 
within the command, and assuming Congress did not pass a supplemental appropriation 
for that specific purpose, the mission funded activity would cease operations until the 
new fiscal year’s funds become available.  This is a risk or lack of flexibility for 
maintenance activities and their use of annual appropriated funds.  The ability to continue 
important maintenance actions can be impaired at the end of the fiscal year should 
maintenance costs exceed annual appropriations. 
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E.  PERFORMANCE AT THE NAVAL INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
FACILITY, PEARL HARBOR         
Prior to the Pearl Harbor Pilot, the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
(NIMF) at Pearl Harbor operated as a stand-alone maintenance activity, performing 
intermediate maintenance upon Navy ships and submarines.  It operated under mission 
funding, receiving its budget authority from the OMN appropriation.  Funding of its 
operations provided for material, facilities, and civilian salaries.  Salaries of military 
personnel working at the NIMF were excluded, as mission funded activities do not 
account for this category.  Rather, military personnel are paid separately through the 
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) appropriation.   
 Like all other mission funded activities, the NIMF was tied to an annual budget 
and was restricted from exceeding its budget.  By aggressively tracking obligation rates 
throughout the fiscal year and by meeting quarterly financial performance goals, the 
NIMF was able to control the operations so as to meet its budget requirements.       
 Throughout this research, there were no significant funding shortfalls noted 
among the pre-consolidation NIMF operations.  Analysis of the NIMF’s fiscal year-end 
financial statements immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor Pilot shows 100 percent 
obligation of its authorized funds. [Ref. 2]  However, these statements do not portray 
work- in-progress that may have been halted as a result of maintenance costs running 
greater than the activity’s appropriated funds.  Critics of the Pearl Harbor Pilot cite this 
potential funding gap as a reason to maintain depot- level maintenance under a WCF 
because of the year-end flexibility to continue operation not provided by appropriated 



































IV.  THE PEARL HARBOR PILOT 
 
A.  REGIONAL MAINTENANCE HISTORY 
Streamlining Naval maintenance received much attention in the 1990s with the 
downsizing of the U.S. military and directives such as the Chief Financial Officer Act of 
1990 and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 calling for focused 
improvements with measurable results.  Then CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, responded 
with the Regional Maintenance Program and began the movement of the integration of 
intermediate- level and depot- level maintenance throughout the Fleet.  In 1996, the RMP 
continued under the following CNO, Admiral Mike Boorda, as he approved intermediate-
level and depot-level maintenance in the Northwest and Mid-Atlantic regions.  In April 
1997, the next CNO, Admiral Jay Johnson ordered ownership of the depot- level 
maintenance facilities transferred to the Fleets.  Later that same year in July, Admiral 
Johnson directed the RMP process be accelerated and to identify immediate consolidation 
candidates.   
Given the conveniences of a single, confined harbor, the logical first candidate for 
intermediate- level and depot- level maintenance consolidation was Pearl Harbor.  Admiral 
Archie Clemins, Commander- in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet during this time stated, 
“the vision of Navy Regional Maintenance is to consolidate maintenance activities within 
a region to reduce the cost of maintenance while preserving waterfront responsiveness.” 
[Ref. 9]  
 
B.  CHANGE BEGINS:  SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE PEARL 
HARBOR PILOT   
The movement toward intermediate- level and depot- level maintenance 
consolidation began in 1994, when the two intermediate- level maintenance facilities then 
at Pearl Harbor, the Submarine Base Intermediate Maintenance Activity and the Shore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity, merged onto fifteen acres of land to become the 
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NIMF.  This installation became the Navy’s first joint submarine and surface ship 
intermediate- level maintenance facility. [Ref. 9] 
In 1996, the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard reduced its workforce by nearly 20 
percent, leaving a staff of 2800.  Concurrent with this reduction in workforce, over one 
third of the billets at the NIMF were transferred from military to civilian personnel.  This 
allowed five hundred civilians, who otherwise may have lost their jobs, to replace 700 
sailors as intermediate- level maintenance workers (refer to Figure 4.2). 
 
C.  PEARL HARBOR PILOT OVERVIEW 
CINCPACFLT and Naval Sea Systems Command, with the final directives from 
the CNO, presented the concept of merging the PHNSY and the NIMF into a single 
organization responsible for all ship maintenance in Hawaii.  Within one year, approval 
was granted from the CNO to stand up the Pearl Harbor Pilot Program.  CINCPACFLT 
and Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEA) signed a Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOA) delineating their individual and mutual responsibilities for the 
successful consolidation of the new facility, now named the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF) and established on April 30, 
1998. [Ref. 10]   
COMNAVSEA is the reporting senior, operating agent, and technical authority 
for the new command.  CINCPACFLT is the major claimant of the PHNSY & IMF and 
also has overall operational and financial management responsibility.  The transfer of 
funding responsibilities to CINCPACFLT became effective beginning in FY 1999. 
All the required operational, business, financial, personnel, command, and work 
processes were developed to guarantee the new activity operated as a single activity with 
a fully integrated workforce, using integrated work processes.  These included: [Ref. 10] 
· Standard work documents 
· Standard quality assurance programs 
· Integrated Automated Information Systems (AIS) 
· An operationally responsive organization 
23 
· Cost effective utilization for all resources 
· A single customer interface process 
· A single command structure for administration, facilities management, 
production, and production support 
 
Additionally, the MOA defined other considerations for the combined facilities to 
implement.  It directed all maintenance functions previously performed by the PHNSY or 
NIMF would now be performed by the new activity.  The work force would consist of a 
completely integrated group of civilian and military personnel in order to reduce excess 
personnel capacity.  Facilities and equipment would be consolidated with the goal of 
eliminating excess facilities, equipment, and duplication.  Standard planning and 
engineering documents would be used for all work in order to streamline the planning 
and technical administration of ship maintenance.  Supply support responsibility would 
be transferred to the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Pearl Harbor to accomplish all 
supply functions, to include hazardous material and non-nuclear transportation 
management. [Ref. 10]   
Finally, in order to achieve a fully integrated activity, it was necessary to establish 
a single financial system.  This system had to capture the activities of both intermediate-
level and depot- level maintenance for budget formulation and throughout budget 
execution.  It was decided that appropriated (mission) funding, vice a revolving fund, 
such as the NWCF, would be used.  The CNO, in cooperation with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress granted permission to convert the PHNSY 
from the NWCF to mission funding, to begin on October 1, 1998. 
 
D.  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TRANSITION TEAM 
In September 1997, CINCPACFLT established a Financial Management 
Transition Team (FMTT) to plan and execute all actions necessary for the financial 
management conversion of the PHNSY from NWCF to mission funding.  From the stand 
up date, April 30, 1998, and throughout the transition year, the new activity continued to 
operate and provide financial reporting under the existing financial systems then in place 
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at the PHNSY and the NIMF.  To prepare and ease the conversion to mission funding by 
October 1, 1998, CINCPACFLT and COMNAVSEA funded operations to the budgeted 
workload from April 30 through September 30, 1998.  Charges for labor and productivity 
measures were tracked on a statistical basis using the Shipyard Management Information 
System (SYMIS), the AIS used previously to track shipyard operations and costs.  In 
accordance with the terms of the intermediate- level and depot- level maintenance 
facilities, the consolidated activity was mission funded in FY 1999 and used the Standard 
Accounting and Reporting System, Field Level (STARS-FL) for official financial 
reporting.  However, SYMIS continued to be used for depot- level maintenance internal 
cost tracking and to feed obligation and expenditure data into STARS-FL.  The financial 
management consolidation of the new activity significantly impacted the internal and 
external reporting of financial data.  Specifically, the change affected every shipyard 
system that collected, used, or reported financial data, to include: [Ref. 11] 
· Production Control 




· Financial Accounting 
The FMTT membership consisted of representatives from CINCPACFLT, 
PHNSY & IMF, FISC, and the Defense Financial and Accounting Service (DFAS).  
From January through May 1998, a series of meetings were held among the members of 
the FMTT.  These meetings successfully identified the processes, business rules, and 
required AIS changes to convert the PHNSY from the NWCF and integrate it with the 
IMF and a single appropriated funding system on October 1, 1998. 
The following provides a summary of the FMTT milestones as a reference for 
consideration by potential organizations which may consider a shift from revolving to 
appropriated funding: [Ref. 11] 
FMTT organized    September 1997 
STARS-FL baseline requirements defined January 1998 
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FMTT follow-up meetings   January, February, May 1998 
AIS programming and unit tests  November 1997 – July 1998 
AIS integration tests    July – August 1998 
Unit training     August – September 1998 
Functional acceptance test   August – September 1998  
Implementation    September 1998 
Pilot execution and customer support  October 1998 – September 1999 
 
 Throughout the Pearl Harbor Pilot transition year, the FMTT identified and solved 
the major issues that challenged the consolidation of two largely different organizations.  
The following is a summary of the major systems or items that were changed or 
overcome to enable the financial merging of the Shipyard with the Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility: [Ref. 11] 
 
1.  Automated Accounting Systems  
Of foremost concern in the conversion of the PHNSY from a revolving fund 
structure to mission funding was the ability to convert the SYMIS data into a readable 
format for STARS-FL.  STARS-FL is the single official accounting system for all Navy 
maintenance-related mission funded activities.  SYMIS required significant manipulation 
and conversion of code to enable input and processing into STARS-FL.  This process was 
developed by the FMTT and is unofficially named the “green box” which overlays 
shipyard financial data into the appropriated funds accounting system. 
 
2.  Unit Identification Code  
A new single unit identification code (UIC) was assigned to the consolidated 
PHNSY & IMF, effective October 1, 1998, beginning the Pearl Harbor Pilot transition 
year.  Along with the UIC, a new DoD Activity Address Code (DoDAAC) was required 
for department-wide visibility of the new organization.  (DFAS) was notified of these 
changes for bill payment and other financial matters.  New Purchase Card Accounts were 
established for the new UIC.  Installation of STARS-FL terminals at the PHNSY with 
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new user accounts was required before the Pilot test fiscal year to conduct training.  
Additionally, the new activity identification had to be established as an authorized 
nuclear material user to accommodate work provided to nuclear powered submarines. 
 
3.  Payroll and Accounting Services 
DFAS provided the general fund accounting, plant property, and bill paying 
services for the new facility beginning October 1, 1998.  DFAS also changed NSY 
employee records and statistics from the old UIC to the new UIC. 
 
4.  SYMIS Remains as Data Source 
The shipyard automated accounting system, SYMIS, remained in use to capture 
certain funding data, job orders, and reportable material transactions and was then linked 
into STARS-FL.  Continuous reconciliation procedures were established between 
STARS-FL and SYMIS to ensure costs and authorization totals reflected the same 
details.  However, conclusions will show these ad hoc procedures were difficult to 
maintain in order to provide full cost visibility of maintenance actions performed. 
 
5.  Operating Budget Setup 
STARS-FL was used to monitor budget execution against the operating budget 
authorization.  Further breakdown of the total operating budget authorization was used 
within the AIS to allow the PHNSY & IMF Comptroller to establish quarterly spending 
targets to separate departments within the activity.   
 
 
6.  NWCF Carryover Jobs and Buyout Costs 
NWCF carryover jobs refer to depot- level maintenance that was fully funded in 
the year before the PHNSY & IMF consolidation and transition to mission funding.  All 
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carryover jobs were fully accounted for under the NWCF in SYMIS until the work and 
final billing were complete. 
Buyout costs refer to the costs associated with transferring a working capital fund 
activity into direct appropriations.  These costs include liabilities, accumulated operating 
results, accrued employee leave, and undepreciated capital assets. [Ref. 12] 
 
7.  Accounting for Depot Costs 
STARS-FL records depot- level maintenance costs via SYMIS and under the 
consolidated activity, CINCPACFLT and Pearl Harbor managers maintain that all 
maintenance is considered the same.  However, Title 10 of United States Code, Section 
2466 requires that not more than 50 percent of funds allocated for depot work in a fiscal 
year can be used for contractor work.  This dilemma creates many questions in the minds 
of the Congress, who are seeking compliance with current laws regarding depot 
maintenance that play an effect on many civilian jobs (both public and private) at stake 
within their respective districts.  This is not an issue in Pearl Harbor, where nearly 100% 
of ship maintenance is being performed at government facilities.  However, depot 
maintenance needs to be formally recorded in order to satisfy the intent of the law. 
  
8.  Training of Personnel to Use Combined STARS-FL/SYMIS 
FMTT personnel developed an integrated training plan to incorporate all revised 
policies, procedures, and processes of the consolidated activity.  Management and 
supervisors were familiarized with the differences between mission funding and the 
NWCF.  All Shipyard financial personnel were given hands-on training at the Honolulu 
DFAS Operating Location (OPLOC) so they could understand the STARS-FL data 
processing requirements 
 
9. Information Security Issues 
 All software that was developed to support the Shipyard’s transition to mission 
funding was documented and developed to meet DoD and DoN security requirements.  
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The activity’s Information Systems Security Officer determined security certification of 
all new computer programming software. 
 
E. LOCAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The Local Board of Directors (LBOD) was formed in November 1998, and has 
met monthly in order to provide advice to the Commander of the PHNSY & IMF.  The 
LBOD consists of operational ship and submarine commanders who submit their 
guidance in concert with the Pearl Harbor ship maintenance and supply-chain managers.  
This monthly exchange of information assists in the development of maintenance 
scheduling that “maximizes resource utilization at PHNSY & IMF and meets operational 
commitments of Fleet assets within [those] funds available.” [Ref. 13]   
The existence of the LBOD can not be understated as a step in the right direction, 
whether maintenance is conducted under revolving or appropriated funds.  It provides a 
frequent forum for communication between the operational commanders and the depot 
and intermediate maintenance facilities.  Before the Pearl Harbor Pilot, depot ship 
maintenance scheduling and budgeting was forecast two years prior to the actual 
execution of the work.  As the working capital fund budget process moved towards the 
year of execution, the planned work was simply assumed to be available as scheduled.  In 
many cases, this was not to be, generating excess labor and overhead capacity at the 
shipyard.  Currently, the schedule validation and recommendations from the LBOD have 
greatly coordinated scheduling and maintenance workflow to properly prioritize work 
and the use of fiscal resources. 
 
F.  PEARL HARBOR PILOT PERFORMANCE METRICS 
 In order to measure the effectiveness of the Pearl Harbor Pilot, nine test metrics 
were chosen to represent a variety of performance measure and issues.  A Naval Audit 
Service (NAS) study was completed in April 1998 to establish a financial cost baseline.  
This study set FY 1997 as the baseline from which to measure all future successes or 
failures of the pilot project.  The results of fiscal years 1999 and 2000 (PHNSY & IMF 
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discontinued the performance metrics during FY 2000 [Ref. 15]) are assessed in section F 
of this chapter to judge the overall effectiveness of the Pearl Harbor Pilot maintenance 
consolidation.  The nine performance metrics were selected to give a broad picture of just 
how effective the consolidation efforts were.  They are categorized into five components: 
· Cost effectiveness 
· Overhead reduction 
· Customer satisfaction 
· Infrastructure reduction 
· Miscellaneous measures 
From these five categories the nine performance metrics are described as follows: 
[Ref. 12] 
1.  Total Cost of a Maintenance Shop Direct Labor Hour of Work Delivered 
to the Customer  
This performance measure is an indicator of efficiency in terms of the cost per 
direct maintenance hour.  It is calculated by taking the total costs of the ship maintenance 
activity and dividing that figure by the total maintenance activity direct labor hours 
delivered.  The results will be displayed in Chapter V as dollars per hour.  A decrease in 
this figure is expected to generate a successful evaluation.   
 
2.  Total Labor Hours Expended to Deliver a Maintenance Shop Direct 
Labor Hour to the Customer 
This metric is an indicator of productivity in terms of personnel utilization.  It is 
found by taking the total available labor hours (overhead plus maintenance hours) and 
dividing it by the total maintenance activity direct labor hours delivered.  The results are 
displayed as a ratio of hours.  A substantial decrease from the FY 1997 baseline year will 





3.  Total Current Ship Maintenance Program (CSMP) Work Items 
Completed 
The CSMP contains a consolidated database of significant problems of a ship.  
This metric is an indicator of productivity in terms of the number of these problems that 
were fixed.  It simply reports the completed CSMP items as a relative measure of 
success.  Therefore, more items completed indicate that more maintenance actions were 
conducted, irrespective of the size of the particular tasks. 
 
 4.  Total CSMP Work Items in the Backlog 
This metric is an indicator of the maintenance condition of Pacific Fleet ships in 
relation to work items not yet completed.  The results display the effectiveness (or 
ineffectiveness) of the consolidated maintenance facility as viewed by the direct number 
of delayed CSMP items in the backlog. 
 
5.  Schedule Adherence of CNO Maintenance Projects 
This performance measure is an indicator of customer satisfaction in regard to 
completing projects on schedule.  It is computed by taking the total of the differences 
between the actual and scheduled completion dates divided by the number of days of the 
total scheduled duration of each CNO ship availability project.  Improvements of this 
metric from before the Pearl Harbor Pilot indicate success of this measure. 
 
6.  Rework Index for CNO Maintenance Projects 
Quality of maintenance actions are indicated by this performance measure.  It is 
calculated by totaling the labor hours expanded to correct work deficiencies divided by 
the total number of direct labor hours performed upon each CNO availability 
maintenance project.  This measure of quality is displayed as a percentage and is 
expected to show no degradation throughout the pilot project and beyond. 
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7.  Activity Work Schedule Integrity Index 
This measurement is another indicator of customer satisfaction.  It is computed by 
comparing labor hours worked to labor hours budgeted throughout the fiscal year.  Any 
decrease of this ratio will yield improvements in adhering to the maintenance schedule. 
 
8.  Casualty Reports Caused By Activity Work 
This metric is an indicator of quality of maintenance as reported by the number of 
casualties, or equipment failures.  It is measured through an analysis of reports collected 
within six months of completion of maintenance actions.  A decrease in casualties 
equates to a higher level of performance of this metric. 
 
9.  Earned Value  
This final performance metric is an indicator of productivity in terms of labor 
hours to complete similar items of work.  It is measured through a statistical analysis of 
labor hours.  Comparison between the FY 1997 baseline labor hours and FY 1999 and 
later years’ labor hours is made to determine a relative measure of success or failure. 
The results of these performance metrics paint a broad picture of the possible 
successes that the consolidated maintenance facility may achieve.  It is important to 
recognize that cost savings are not supposed to be the primary reason for this major shift 
in business operations.  Rather, it is to realize a more efficient workforce, performing 
more high-quality maintenance each day.  Figure 2 displays the results of the nine 
performance metrics. 
 
G.  EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The Pearl Harbor Pilot program was conducted from October 1st, 1998 through 
September 30th, 1999.  The Pilot was generally deemed a success, although the results of 
the nine performance metrics were mixed.  They displayed measures of improvements, 
unchanged performance, or decreased performance.  Apparently satisfied with these 
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initial results and wanting to continue the development of the Regional Maintenance 
Program, the CNO granted approval for the joint CINCPACFLT and NAVSEA venture 
to continue, and the PHNSY & IMF continued its consolidated operations into FY 2000 
and through to present day.  The following is an evaluation of the performance metrics 
from the Pilot year (FY 1999) and beyond (FY 2000 (when available)): [Ref. 8, 12] 
 
1.  Measures of Improved Performance 
Metric number one, cost per unit output, has achieved success in lowering the 
total cost of delivering one maintenance shop direct labor hour to the customer.  The 
NAS found the combined facility to charge $149.60 in its FY 1997 baseline study.  At the 
End of Fiscal Year (EOFY) 2000, the cost was only $136.07, exceeding the performance 
expectations.  
 Metric number two, production efficiency and resource utilization has also 
achieved success in reducing the total labor hours expected to deliver a maintenance shop 
direct labor hour to the customer.  The NAS baseline study reported a 3.15 ratio in FY 
1997.  At the end of FY 2000, the PHNSY & IMF achieved a successful measure of 2.99.  
This result shows that the ability to move workers from intermediate- level to depot- level 
jobs had a favorable impact upon getting more work done with a fixed amount of 
workers. 
 Metric number four, material readiness of the Pearl Harbor based ships, met its 
expectation of having fewer than 15,960 CSMP work items in the backlog.  Although this 
measure achieved success, there are some externally driven factors that directly 
influenced the backlog rather than the efforts of the Pearl Harbor Pilot.  These are: [Ref. 
12]  
· Decommissioning of ships home-ported at Pearl Harbor resulted in less 
potential CSMP items. 
· Increased maintenance inspections tended to create more CSMP items. 
· Procedural changes in identifying work items may either increase or 
decrease the CSMP backlog. 
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 Metric number seven, schedule integrity, also showed improvement by the end of 
FY 1999.  The activity work schedule integrity index decreased slightly between the 
baseline year and the end of the pilot project, indicating a favorable assessment.  This 
success was a result of the changes in maintenance procedures and efficiencies created by 
the consolidation of the two maintenance facilities.   
 
2.  Measures of Unchanged Performance 
Metric number six, quality, did not show a significant change in performance 
during the Pilot test period and beyond.  The FY 1997 baseline year displays a .76 
percent rework of maintenance.  One of the goals of the Pearl Harbor consolidation was 
to ensure workmanship quality did not degrade from the former Shipyard’s and NIMF’s 
previous levels.  The conclusion of the Pilot period shows 1.08 percent rework of 
maintenance at the end of FY 1999.  Even though this marks a slight decrease in 
productivity from the baseline year, the Navy judged this as an insignificant difference 
from the previous quality of work, and thus achieved a success of ensuring consistent 
quality of work to the customers of the Pearl Harbor consolidated maintenance activity. 
Metric number eight, new casualty reports (CASREP), shows little change 
throughout the test period.  There were only two CASREPs noted during the FY 1997 
baseline year and then four CASREPs identified during the Pilot period.  Although this is 
a 100 percent increase, these numbers are relatively low considering the thousands of 
work items that the consolidated activity performs each year.  Therefore, these values 
indicate there are no significant problems with the overall quality of maintenance both 
before and after the Pearl Harbor Pilot.   
Metric number nine, earned value, shows no overall degradation.  This metric is 
computed by measuring labor hours to complete a unit of work during FY 1997 and 
comparing it to the hours to complete a similar unit of work during the Pilot year.  This 
statistical analysis resulted in virtually no change between the baseline and the test year 
and beyond and is therefore inconclusive as to whether the efforts of the Pearl Harbor 
Pilot actually had an effect on maintaining the same level of hours to maintenance action.   
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3.  Measures of Decreased Performance 
 Metric number three, maintenance actions completed, shows a significantly lower 
number of maintenance actions completed than desired from the Pearl Harbor Pilot 
performance expectations.  The FY 1997 baseline year shows 19,777 items completed 
and the expectation was to maintain or exceed that same level of work completion.  
However, only 8,985 work items were completed at the end of FY 2000.  This is in part 
due to the loss of active duty military enlisted personnel from 1,416 in 1996 to 680 in 
1999 (see Figure 2 for detailed personnel trends).  However, due to efficiencies in 
workforce assignment abilities of the consolidated activity, civilian workers were now 
able to be moved from different type of jobs at a moments’ notice and few (less than ten 
at any time) were ever sitting idle in the “Excess Labor Shop.”  Further, the consolidated 
activity hired an additional 82,785 borrowed labor hours more in FY 1999 than in the 
baseline year.  In FY 2000, the PHNSY & IMF nearly double these numbers as well.  
Borrowed labor hours are performed by borrowed workers from other shipyards 
throughout the Navy as they are made available.  The second line of metric number three 
in Figure 4.1 normalizes this complication of personnel to derive a fair expectation of 
completed maintenance actions throughout personnel reductions.  However, even as it is 
normalized, the consolidated activity fell 2,733 jobs short of expectation. 
 Metric number five, customer satisfaction, has also failed to meet performance 
expectations and achieved a schedule adherence rating of 18.6 percent late.  The baseline 
year and performance expectations of this metric called for improved performance better 
than 11.4 percent of projects completed on-time.  One of the factors listed as a success of 
the Pearl Harbor Pilot, the ability to shift workers from depot- level work to intermediate-
level work (and vice-versa), now appears as a detriment to the evaluation of this metric .  
The process of shifting workers has tended to remove those workers needed for long-term 
Depot Modernization Period (DMP) projects.  DMP projects are complex overhauls 
directed by the CNO and are generally greater than 13 months and 140,000 labor days.  
Short-term Fleet maintenance projects (intermediate-level work) are usually given higher 
priority in worker assignment decisions than are longer, more complex maintenance 
projects.   
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For example, the USS Chicago DMP was started on May 11, 1998 and was 
scheduled for completion on May 11, 1999.  However, it was not completed until 
February 11, 2000.  Prior to the consolidation at Pearl Harbor, all CNO directed projects 
were fully staffed by depot workers and these workers were not subject to being assigned 
to intermediate- level work.  Today, there is a commonly pooled workforce from which 
laborers are assigned to different tasks according to the Shipyard and IMF Commanders’ 
priorities.  The nine-month delay of the USS Chicago committed workers to the project 
for those extended months, which then caused slippages in the completion of other long-
term CNO maintenance projects.       
 













1 Cost Per Unit Output 
Ensuring Total Cost Visibility  
$149.60 $142.12-145.11 $136.07 Met Expectation 
2 Production Efficiency and 
Resource Utilization 
3.15 2.99-3.06 2.99 Met Expectation 
3 Maintenance Actions 
Completed 
19,777 19,777 8,985 Inconclusive 








8,985 2,733 jobs short of 
Expectation 
4 Material Readiness of the 
Pearl Harbor Based Ships  
17,733 15,960 15,218 Met Expectation 






18.6% (Late) Includes Chicago DMP 
(2.7% Late without 
Chicago) 
6 Quality   0.76% No Degradation 1.08%(FY99) Maintained Quality 
7 Schedule Integrity  
 
1.23 Decrease is 
Improvement 
1.16   (FY99) Improvement 
8 New CASREPs 2 Decrease is 
Improvement 
    4    (FY99) Maintained Quality 
Note 1 








one number   
(FY99) 
No Degradation in 
Earned Value Note 2 
Notes: 
1)  Very small number of CASREPs indicates quality of work remains excellent. 
2)  The differences are so small that they are statistically insignificant.  Earned Value remains unchanged. 
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H.  OTHER MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE  
1.  Personnel Efficiencies 
The Navy’s largest benefit in the Pearl Harbor Pilot consolidation has been that of 
integrating two separate workforces into one.  Approximately 4,000 workers have been 
integrated from two separate units into a common labor pool, allowing management the 
ability to shift workers between intermediate- level and depot- level maintenance 
assignments.  Before consolidation of the Shipyard and the Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility, it was difficult to make such personnel reassignments because the two 
organizations operated under separate command and financial structures.  The variations 
in the workloads between the two organizations created situations of excess labor on any 
given day, leaving 100 to 200 workers assigned to the “Excess Labor Shop” to perform 
menial duties.  Once consolidation occurred, managers were able to shift personnel as 
necessary to fill shortages on critical maintenance projects.  Thus, the daily number of 
workers assigned to the excess labor shop quickly dropped below ten.  Today, this issue 
has become so insignificant that excess labor is no longer measured. [Ref. 14] 
 
2.  Streamlining Infrastructure  
Another key success factor of the Pearl Harbor Pilot has been the physical 
reduction of maintenance infrastructure.  For example, the U.S. Naval Base at Pearl 
Harbor supported 167 buildings, 85 structures, and 262 acres in 1996 for the segregated 
Shipyard and IMF.  Today, that footprint has been reduced to 166 buildings, 81 
structures, and 220 acres, generating an estimated savings of over $300,000 per year in 
reduced infrastructure and operating costs for those facilities.  There are also long-range 
plans looking forward to FY 2008 to continue these infrastructure reductions and to 
accomplish the required levels of maintenance with a streamlined facility footprint.  
These draw-downs project reductions to 92 buildings and 54 structures situated upon 112 
acres. [Ref. 8]  These projections equate to 45% reduction of buildings, 36% reductions 
of structures, and 57% reduction in acreage from the 1996 levels. 
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I.  CRITICS OF THE PEARL HARBOR PILOT 
The most critical response regarding the results of the Pearl Harbor Pilot came 
from the General Accounting Office (GAO).  GAO acts as the investigative arm of the 
Congress and exists to support the Congress in meeting its Constitutional responsibilities 
of ensuring Federal programs are generating the desired results.  In its January, 2001 
report, “Depot Maintenance:  Key Financial Issues for Consolidation at Pearl Harbor and 
Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved,” GAO concludes,  
“Although managers and workers performing ship maintenance and 
repairs at Pearl Harbor may not be directly affected, the lack of reliable 
cost and performance data impairs the ability of senior OSD and Navy 
officials to make timely, well- informed decisions to facilitate the effective 
and efficient management of the Navy’s overall ship maintenance 
activities, the Pearl Harbor consolidation, and other potential 
consolidations of ship maintenance activities.  More specifically, to 
provide senior OSD and Navy officials reliable cost and performance data 
to facilitate their decision-making process, the Navy needs to implement a 
method that includes appropriate costing methodologies or techniques that 
provide sufficient data to (1) adequately identify and account for the total 
cost of operations, (2) distinguish between depot and intermediate work 
performed by consolidated ship maintenance activities, and (3) show 
compliance with 10 U.S.C. 2466, the Chief Financial Officer Act, the 
Government Performance and Results Act, DoD regulations, and federal 
accounting standards.” [Ref. 12]         
 
Additionally, the report recommended that the Congress require the Secretary of 
the Navy to report the following: [Ref. 12] 
· Strategy and timeline for resolution of buyout costs for the 
consolidated maintenance activity to transfer costs from the Navy 
Working Capital Fund. 
· Strategy to overcome the loss of flexibility to continue ship 
maintenance operations through potential funding gaps at the 
commencement of fiscal years or when maintenance costs exceed 
annual appropriations. 




Obviously, the GAO has some substantial doubts regarding the success of the 
Pearl Harbor Pilot and the future consolidations proposed by the Navy’s Regional 
Maintenance Program.  The Department of Defense concurred with all of the findings of 
the GAO study and indicated that “future evaluations will draw upon lessons learned 
from the Pearl Harbor Pilot consolidations.” [Ref. 12]    
Regardless of the GAO concerns, the general feeling throughout the PHNSY & 
IMF is one of a job successfully completed and of having done the “right thing.”  As 
mentioned above in the GAO comments, “managers and workers performing ship 
maintenance and repairs at Pearl Harbor may not be directly affected” by the deviations 
from standard cost collecting procedures under a working capital fund system which 
ensures total cost visibility.  However, they are directly affected by the benefits that have 
generated a workforce that is more responsive to the daily demands of intermediate- level 














V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
A.  EVALUATING THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PEARL HARBOR 
PILOT PROJECT 
The Pearl Harbor Pilot Project officially ended on September 30, 1999.  Based 
upon the results of the Pilot and for the Navy to obtain a clearer picture of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the consolidation, the PHNSY & IMF was granted approval to 
continue its operations under appropriated funding through and beyond present day.  The 
consolidation of intermediate- level and depot- level naval ship maintenance in Hawaii has 
generated improved operations by making more effective use of personnel, facilities, and 
equipment.  However, overall results of the consolidation are mixed.  Evaluation of the 
nine performance metrics with the most recent data show four measures of improvement, 
three measures of no change, and two instances of reduced performance as compared to 
the FY 1997 baseline year.   
Applying these performance metrics appears to have undermined, to some extent, 
the sense of accomplishment of CINCPACFLT and the PHNSY & IMF.  In fact, as the 
consolidated maintenance facility at Pearl Harbor continues operation, these metrics have 
been disregarded as irrelevant and are no longer measured.  Instead, it focuses strictly on 
budget execution as an appropriated fund activity, simply ensuring it does not over-
obligate its apportionment of funds.  As the Navy’s Regional Maintenance Program 
continues and prepares to expand to different shipyards and maintenance facilities, the 
Navy is developing a set of “National Metrics” for use in future intermediate- level and 
depot-level maintenance consolidations. [Ref. 15]  The next scheduled facility to convert 
to appropriated funding is the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNSY).  This conversion is 
currently suspended, awaiting further analysis by the DoN and OSD. [Ref. 5]  Once 
developed, the National Metrics will address the Pearl Harbor Pilot’s areas of concern 
and will again be applied to measure the level of success of all consolidated maintenance 
activities. 
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1.  Challenges 
The greatest challenge that the Pearl Harbor Pilot faced was change.  Merging two 
independent organizations with separate command structures, financial systems, and 
work routines into a consolidated organization required much planning, fortitude, and 
teamwork.  With regard to the merging of financial systems, the Financial Management 
Transition Team was faced with a major consolidation of information from two complex 
information management systems.  The conversion of a Navy Working Capital Fund 
system to an appropriated fund system implies major differences in the way financial 
transactions are processed.  These changes impact the entire activity’s basic business 
processes.  All personnel, from the commander down to the newest laborer must 
understand the changes that impact their everyday operations.   
There has been much attention paid to the Pearl Harbor Pilot from agencies 
outside the Navy.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) twice visited Pearl Harbor to 
report on the consolidations’ progress.  The reports that GAO provides are viewed as 
authoritative and carry much weight throughout Washington D.C. with the Congress, the 
DoD, and other influential stakeholders.  As such, the Pearl Harbor Pilot is a 
controversial project because it defied many set patterns of operation and involved the 
transformation of several thousand civilian jobs. 
 
2.  Benefits of Consolidation 
 The benefits of the Pearl Harbor Pilot are realized mainly in the efficiencies of 
personnel, facilities, and equipment management.  Over 4,000 workers from two separate 
facilities were merged into a common labor pool, thus increasing management flexibility 
in assigning workers to maintenance projects. [Ref. 12]  Because of this consolidation, 
the Navy was able to reduce its facilities and equipment footprint, reducing the number of 
buildings and the corresponding equipment in the maintenance complex. 
 The Pilot also realized some benefits through stabilized labor rates.  The cost per 
unit of output decreased over thirteen dollars per hour during the FY 1999 and FY 2000 
test years.  Production efficiency and resource utilization also achieved success in 
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reducing the total labor hours expected to deliver a maintenance shop direct labor hour to 
the customer.   
 Other benefits were the decreased number of Consolidated Ship’s Maintenance 
Plan work items in the Shipyard’s backlog and improvements in overall schedule 
adherence.     
 
3.  Drawbacks of Consolidation 
The Pearl Harbor Pilot project attracted much scrutiny regarding the concern of 
whether a shipyard could, or should, be operated in conjunction with the IMF as a 
mission funded activity.  There was no doubt that the CNO’s Regional Maintenance 
Program called for this type of consolidation of operations and accounting for naval ship 
maintenance, but still many interested parties had reservations concerning the feasibility 
of the changes at the consolidated maintenance activity.  As stated earlier in the 
conclusions, change was the greatest challenge to the success of the Pilot project.  There 
were many growing pains associated with the details of merging two organizations with a 
combined annual budget in excess of $375 million. [Ref. 8] 
 
B.  ADVANTAGES OF APPROPRIATED FUNDING 
 There were many advantages associated with the PHNSY & IMF consolidation 
under appropriated funding.  The main reason an appropriated funding system was 
decided upon, vice consolidating under the Navy Working Capital Fund, was because 
CINCPACFLT contributes over 90 percent of the work provided to the Shipyard and 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility. [Ref. 14]  Therefore, CINCPACFLT has a great deal 
of control over the flow of repair work that could potentially be delayed and could greatly 
damage the financial solvency of the revolving fund activity (i.e. less work equates to 
higher rates per unit of work).  A “customer to seller” rela tionship between the Fleet and 
the Shipyard did not truly exist under the former PHNSY working capital fund system 
because CINCPACFLT had nearly all control over the flow of work to the Shipyard. 
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 Another advantage to appropriated, or mission, funding is that the financial 
system is much more simple.  It operates on a 100 percent obligation of funds principle, 
ensuring that quarterly goals are being met throughout the year.  There are no worries 
about achieving a net operating revenue goal, or taking a loss over the course of a fiscal 
year in order to maintain a stabilized rate for work produced. 
 A third advantage to mission funding is that now the consolidated Shipyard and 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility has the potential to create increased cost visibility for 
all levels of maintenance.  Since the consolidation occurred, the Shipyard Management 
Information System fed its data into the Standard Accounting and Reporting System, 
Field Level.  This gives the ability for all levels (organizational, intermediate, and depot) 
of maintenance actions to be input to SYMIS to show additional levels of cost details.  
However, because this is a complicated process, it typically is not accomplished to a 
significant degree.  In everyday practice, this has become a disadvantage of appropriated 
funding, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
C.  DISADVANTAGES OF APPROPRIATED FUNDING 
As an appropriated fund activity, the PHNSY & IMF now has to focus upon its 
budget execution to ensure it does not over-obligate its apportionment of funds.  This is a 
disadvantage of the consolidated maintenance activity’s use of appropriated funds 
because this practice tends to discount the advantages that increased cost visibility may 
provide for management decisions.  The General Accounting Office expressed this 
concern in its January 2001 report and recommended that the Navy “implement a method 
to account for the total cost of consolidated ship maintenance operations on an ongoing 
basis.” [Ref. 12]  Although the PHNSY & IMF claim they have increased total cost 
visibility, they do not have a well-established method for displaying such data in a 
consistent method.  This is most likely the result of the complicated daily management of 
the SYMIS and STARS-FL interface, which is overly burdensome in achieving the 
desired level of consistency in cost tracking. 
A second disadvantage to the consolidated activity’s use of appropriated funding 
is that every dollar is scrutinized by the fiscal chain-of-command: CINCPACFLT, 
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NAVSEA, Resource Sponsors, and ASN(FM&C).  The Shipyard’s funds are now in 
competition for other programs that use the same limited appropriation.  It is ironic that 
now, the consolidated maintenance activity’s budget is open for review to make cuts, or 
marks, whereas under the Navy Working Capital Fund, the stand-alone Shipyard’s 
resource sponsors did not visualize the “taxes” and other “corporate costs” for centrally 
managed programs.  These costs were protected within its revolving fund operations. 
[Ref. 15] 
Another disadvantage of appropriated funding is that every obligated dollar 
expires after September 30th each fiscal year.  Therefore, there is no incentive to save 
money towards the end of the year.  Doing so only makes the activity a target for budget 
reductions the following year.  This “spend it or lose it” mentality pervades all 
appropriated fund activities, and is simply an inefficient, although unintended, creation of 
the federal appropriations system. 
The use of mission funding at the PHNSY & IMF creates the disadvantage of 
funding unscheduled, high priority jobs first, at the expense of scheduled maintenance 
projects.  Under revolving fund operations, all work, regardless of priority was funded up 
front with a project order.  Because there is now a limited amount of appropriated funds 
available throughout the year, the consolidated Shipyard & IMF Commander must decide 
(aided by the Local Board of Directors) which projects to fund first in order to get the 
most amount of Fleet critical maintenance accomplished.  In several instances, routine 
work- in-progress was halted, while personnel and funds were immediately transferred to 
a higher priority job.  This practice affected the timely completion of Depot 
Modernization Period projects (which of course, also delayed the ships’ future 
deployment schedules) at Pearl Harbor, as shown in the results of Metric number five, 
customer satisfaction. 
One final disadvantage for the operations of the consolidated activity under 
appropriated funding is the loss of flexibility to continue routine ship maintenance 
operations at the beginning of new fiscal years or through potential funding gaps when 
appropriations are not made available or have been completely obligated. [Ref. 12]  The 
Navy Working Capital Fund provides insurance against these possibilities, as funds are 
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available for work without regard to fiscal year limits.  The supplemental funds granted 
towards continuing operations at the PHNSY & IMF during the past two years ($19 and 
$20 million during FY 2000 and 2001, respectively) illustrate lackluster performance, as 
well as the complexity, of the consolidated facility to properly budget its work schedule 
versus constrained fiscal resources. [Ref. 17]     
 
D.  MARINE CORPS DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE IMPLICATIONS 
1.  Background 
 The Marine  Corps operates two depot maintenance activities, one located at 
Albany, Georgia, and the other at Barstow, California.  These maintenance centers 
maintain similar capabilities, and are primarily responsible for the repair, rebuild, and 
modification of all types of ground combat and combat support equipment.  They also 
have the secondary mission of providing limited intermediate- level maintenance 
capabilities to the same equipment.  The Marine Corps maintenance depots operate under 
the Navy Working Capital Fund structure.  Along with this funding structure, the depots 
have often achieved substantial losses in annual net operating results and the resulting 
accumulated operating results, but events are underway to streamline AOR losses at the 
Marine Corps depots. [Ref. 18]     
Not unlike the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the Marine Corps maintenance 
depots experience difficulties in forecasting the workload from their customers two years 
in advance of execution.  However, the past two fiscal years have generated relatively 
large revenues for the Albany and Barstow depots.  FY 2001 resulted in over $209 
million of revenue for the two USMC depot facilities and the years’ NOR was $19 
million.  FY 2000’s NOR was likewise impressive, at nearly $17 million with over $215 
million of revenue. [Ref. 19]  
However, fiscal years 1999 and 1998 ended with large negative NORs and 
substantially less revenue was generated due to less maintenance throughput.  What were 
some of the influences to mark this turnaround?  Included below is a description of 
45 
current events at the USMC depots which highlight an institutional desire for efficiency 
within the existing working capital fund structure. 
 
2.  Discussion 
 Throughout the past several years, the Navy Comptroller has annually requested 
the Marine Corps to justify the reasons why its depot- level maintenance operations 
should continue under the NWCF as opposed to transforming these maintenance 
operations under an appropriated funding system.  Reasons for this annual review of 
funding source stem from the challenges of developing an effective and realistic budget, 
the limited base of customers who utilize the Marine Corps maintenance depots, and 
simply striving to find the best financial management practices possible. 
 The Marine Corps is no different from any other service in its challenge to create 
and maintain an accurate budget.  Under a revolving fund system, both the customer and 
the provider of service must establish an agreed upon level of work to correspond to the 
customer’s expected annual budget and the customer’s expected demand of work.  
However, since this is typically established nearly two years prior to the budget year in 
question, the actual demand for work, and thus the rates for the performance of that work, 
will contain large variances.   
 As revolving fund activities, the Marine Corps depots offer their services to any 
customer who is willing to pay the going rate for the performance of maintenance.  
Historically, these depots provide approximately 95 percent of their maintenance efforts 
towards Marine Corps ground equipment customers.  The remaining five percent of work 
is performed on a cost-reimbursable basis for other military services and agencies.  This 
situation parallels the relationship between the former Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and 
CINCPACFLT.  If the Marine Corps provides the large majority of work to its depots, is 





3.  KPMG Study 
In 1998, the Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) consultant group was 
contracted to study Marine Corps depot maintenance and provide a list of funding options 
with the goal of “maximizing the efficiency of customer repair dollars.” [Ref. 20]  KPMG 
arrived at three options for the Marine Corps to explore: [Ref. 20] 
1.  Continue operations with revolving funds (with modifications). 
2.  Convert operations to be funded with direct appropriations. 
3.  Convert operations under a combination of revolving and direct funds. 
Option three was disregarded as too complex.  The procedures involved in using a 
combination of funding were determined to have too many conflicting regulations and 
business standards to compliment one another towards a more efficient organization. 
Option two, although many advantages exist, was ultimately disregarded during 
this study for all the same disadvantages described above (as pertaining to the Pearl 
Harbor Pilot). 
Option one, therefore, was endorsed as the method of which to embrace, with 
modifications to support improved financial performance.  The modifications proposed 
were the implementation of Activity Based Costing (ABC) principles towards the 
everyday operations, execution of funds throughout the year, and budgeting towards the 
future. 
ABC is an accounting method that helps achieve true cost allocation and 
visibility.  It provides management the ability to allocate costs to each function of 
business (operations, activities, products, or customers). [Ref. 20]  ABC enables both 
direct and indirect costs to be traced to each task.  By accurately assigning costs to each 
business function, the depots can obtain a more complete picture of what their stabilized 
billing rates should be in order to achieve a balanced NOR, and thus an AOR equal to 
zero.   
 With the Marine Corps depots achieving a negative NOR of over $8 million and 
$13 million in FYs 1998 and 1999 respectively, Marine Corps Material Command 
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(MARCORMATCOM) quickly responded to the KPMG recommendations and began 
implementing the ABC accounting principles. [Ref. 19]  
 Remaining within the Navy Working Capital Fund structure, Marine Corps depots 
have maintained the funding flexibility which no-year appropriations are privileged.  
Additionally, the stabilized rate process enables the depots to understand all costs and 
thus, react quickly to cost drivers, enabling the maintenance facilities to provide quality 
work at the most competitive price. [Ref. 20]  
 As stated earlier, the most two most recent fiscal year endings have recognized 
significant positive NORs from Marine Corps depot maintenance facilities.  As such, 
MARCORMATCOM can now pave its way towards achieving decreases in unit cost and 
increases in throughput of work as stated in its 2001 Strategic Business Plan to “become 
the source of repair for depot maintenance.” [Ref. 21] 
 For the same reasons the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Regional 
Maintenance Program and the Congress enacted the Chief Financial Officer Act and the 
Government Performance and Results Act, the Marine Corps should keep its collective 
eyes open to the best financial management practices available.  The Pearl Harbor Pilot 
provides a case study, rich with lessons learned, regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of revolving funds versus appropriated funds.  
 
E.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1.  Why Not Revolving Funds? 
A study exploring the possibility of the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility to be reorganized under the Navy Working Capital 
Fund, would be a useful counter to the conclusions of this thesis.  What are the reasons 
the Navy has been reluctant to implement its Regional Maintenance Program at other 
shipyards?  Will the Navy continue the RMP using the NWCF?  If so, will Pearl Harbor 




2.  Marine Corps Depot Conversion to Appropriated Funding 
A study focusing purely on the Marine Corps depot- level maintenance possibility 
of converting to appropriated funding would be a useful update to past inquiries of the 
same subject.  This seems to be a controversial topic.  What are the issues?  Who are the 
stakeholders?  Why does the Marine Corps choose to remain in the Navy Working 
Capital Fund for its depot-level maintenance?   
 
3. Marine Corps Depot Maintenance and ABC 
Document the Marine Corps’ success or failure in implementing Activity Based 
Costing at its depot maintenance facilities.  Propose any additional funding 






















LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ABC    Activity Based Costing  
AIS   Automated Information System 
AOR   Accumulated Operating Result 
ASN (FM)  Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) 
CASREP  Casualty Report 
CFO   Chief Financial Officer 
CINCPACFLT  Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 
CNO   Chief of Naval Operations 
CNO N82  Chief of Naval Operations Financial Management Responsible 
Office 
COMNAVSEA  Commander Naval Sea Systems Command 
CSMP   Consolidated Ship’s Maintenance Plan 
DBOF   Defense Business Operation Fund 
DFAS   Defense Financial and Accounting Service 
DMP   Depot Modernization Period 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DoDAAC   Department of Defense Activity Address Code 
DoN   Department of the Navy 
FISC   Fleet Industrial Supply Center 
FMTT   Financial Management Transition Team 
FY   Fiscal Year 
G&A   General and Administrative 
GAO   General Accounting Office 
GPRA   Government Performance and Results Act 
HQMC   Headquarters Marine Corps 
IMF   Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
KPMG   Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
LBOD   Local Board of Directors 
MARCORMATCOM Marine Corps Material Command 
MOA   Memorandum of Agreement 
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MPN   Military Personnel Navy 
NAS   Naval Audit Service 
NIMF   Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
NSY   Naval Shipyard 
NWCF   Navy Working Capital Fund 
O&M   Operation and Maintenance 
OMB   Office of Management and Budget 
OMN   Operation and Maintenance Navy 
OPTAR   Operating Target 
OSD   Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PBD   Presidential Budget Decision 
PHNSY   Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
PHNSY & IMF Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility 
PPBS  Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
PSNSY  Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
RMP  Regional Maintenance Program 
SCN  Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy 
SECNAV  Secretary of the Navy 
SRF  Ship Refit Facility 
STARS-FL  Standard Accounting and Reporting System, Field Level 
SYMIS  Shipyard Management Information System 
UIC  Unit Identification Code 
USD(C)  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
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